A pressure wave in the air, a set of equations, or scratches on a clay tablet: “Such physical or formal things can refer to something beyond themselves,” Neil Dewar says. “They can carry a sentence, describe a planet’s motion, record a debt or represent a physical theory.” Dewar is interested in how this is possible: how one thing can stand for another, and how meaning arises. Philosophers call this the question of “aboutness”, a mystery that, Dewar says, has stayed with him throughout his career.

Neil Dewar is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge and an alumnus of LMU. His research brings together philosophy, physics, logic and the philosophy of science. At its centre is the role of mathematical representation in physics. “Physical theories use equations, models and mathematical structures, allowing scientists to calculate, predict and test claims about reality. But they also raise a philosophical question: how does mathematics come to represent the physical world?” For Dewar, this is not only a technical question, but one about meaning.

Born in Scotland, he studied Physics and Philosophy at Oxford, a joint programme combining the two subjects. He had considered physics, perhaps mathematics, but also subjects such as philosophy or politics. “When I came across the combined programme, it seemed like a good way of deferring that decision,” he says, laughing.